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APPROXIMATING DEMOCRACY:
A PROPOSAL FOR
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
Allan Ides*
The State of California elects a bicameral legislature through a firstpast-the-post electoral system. Beginning in 2012, the election of
California state legislators will be through an open primary, two-round
system. Neither of these electoral systems provides for proportional
representation in the legislature. Accordingly, neither system leads to a
truly representative democracy. The author recommends that the state
adopt a proportional representation electoral system—specifically, a
mixed-member system—as a more democratic alternative to the
plurality/majority systems now in place or projected to be implemented
in 2012. In addition, the author explains why the state legislature
should be unicameral and increased in size from the current 120
legislators to 320.

* Christopher N. May Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Many thanks to
Rick Hasen, Justin Levitt, Karl Manheim, Christopher May, and Robert Richie for their many
helpful insights and suggestions; and additional thanks to Justin Levitt for his invaluable
assistance in helping me work through the pre-draft ideas for this proposal. Thanks also to Bora
Panduku for her thorough research assistance.
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“The pure idea of democracy . . . is the government of the
whole people by the whole people, equally represented.
Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced
is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of
the people, exclusively represented. The former is
synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter,
strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege,
in favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess
practically any voice in the State.”
John Stuart Mill**
I. INTRODUCTION
The state of California maintains a bicameral legislature
composed of a state senate and an assembly.1 The state senate
consists of forty members, each of whom voters elect to serve a fouryear term representing a specific, single-member state senate
district.2 The assembly consists of eighty members, each of whom
voters elect to serve a two-year term representing a specific, singlemember assembly district.3 Under the current electoral system,
named candidates for each district enter into an electoral contest
against one or more other candidates for the privilege of representing
that district. The candidate receiving the most votes wins, regardless
of whether that candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes
cast.4
This method of electing members to a legislative body is
sometimes referred to as a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system or,
more descriptively, as a “plurality single-member district system.”5
** JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 132 (1861).
1. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 21100–21140 (West 2003).
3. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a); ELEC. §§ 21200–21280.
4. ELEC. § 15450. Beginning in 2012, pursuant to Proposition 14, Top Two Primaries Act,
which was approved by California voters on June 10, 2010, the electoral system for the state
legislature and for California’s congressional seats will be changed to a two-round system under
which the two leading candidates in the first round will face one another in a second round runoff.
See infra text accompanying note 28. A number of lawsuits have been filed challenging the
constitutionality of Proposition 14. See California Proposition 14, Top Two Primaries Act (June
2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_14,_Top_
Two_Primaries_Act_(June_2010) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
5. INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, ELECTORAL SYSTEM
DESIGN: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 28 (2005) [hereinafter ELECTORAL
SYSTEM DESIGN].
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FPTP is a type of winner-take-all electoral method in which the
winner of the election contest is awarded the seat and in which the
losers, no matter how close the vote, take nothing.6 FPTP is common
throughout the United States and is a relatively simple system that
focuses on the election of identified individual candidates who, if
elected, are expected to be responsive to the constituency that elected
them.
As an alternative to winner-take-all electoral systems, many
modern democracies, including most European nations, have adopted
systems premised, at least in part, on the principle of proportional
representation (PR).7 The basic idea behind PR is that in a
representative democracy the composition of the governing
legislature should approximate the actual preferences of the electors.8
Thus, under a “party list” PR system, typical of many nations, if
40 percent of the electors vote for Party A, 35 percent vote for Party
B, and 25 percent vote for Party C, the legislature will be similarly
composed. The proportional goal can also be accomplished through a
single-transferable-vote (STV) system in which “voters rank-order
candidates in multi-member districts,”9 though this particular
electoral system tends to be used most often for the election of
smaller government bodies, such as city councils and school boards.
For example, Cambridge, Massachusetts, has been using STV to
elect its city council since 1941.10
A third alternative is the mixed-member proportional (MMP)
system.11 In an MMP system, some legislators are elected under a
plurality system, such as FPTP (or a similar majority-premised
alternative), while others are elected using some version of a PR
system (either party list or STV, most typically, the former).12 The
MMP system can result in a bicameral legislature (with each branch
6. Other electoral systems falling within the “plurality/majority” rubric include block vote,
party block vote, alternative vote, and two-round system. Id. For a more detailed description of
these alternatives, see id. at 44–56.
7. Id. at 23–24 tbl.1, 30–33 tbls.2 & 3, fig.2.
8. Id. at 29.
9. Id.; see also id. at 71–77 (describing STV generally and providing a case study of the
Republic of Ireland, which has used STV to elect its lower house of Parliament since 1921).
10. The City of Cambridge provides detailed information on its electoral system at
http://www.cambridgema.gov/election/Proportional_Representation.cfm.
11. ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 29.
12. Id. at 91, 95.
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elected under one or the other system) or in a unicameral legislature
(with the overall composition of that legislature reflecting the rough
proportionality of composite preferences expressed through the
combined FPTP and PR elections). The unicameral form of MMP,
combining FPTP and party-list PR, has been used in Germany since
1949 (with various modifications over the years).13
This Article proposes a system for the election of California
legislators that moves away from the state’s exclusive reliance on
FPTP, a reliance that, as explained below, is distinctly problematic
from a democratic point of view. The ultimate goal is to offer an
alternative to FPTP that increases California’s potential to achieve a
system approximating a true, representative democracy. It must be
noted at the outset, however, that no electoral system is perfect from
a democratic perspective and that the success of whichever system
the people of a state choose depends in significant part on both the
engagement of the electorate and the civic virtue of the elected
representatives. There are, however, degrees of imperfection and
plenty of room for comparative evaluation. An examination of these
factors might well lead us toward a closer affiliation with the
democratic ideals.
II. THE PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS OPTIONS
This part will discuss and assess the pros and cons of what might
be called standard electoral systems. The discussion here is not
meant to be exhaustive, but it is meant to provide a fair assessment of
various realistic options and to provide enough information to begin
an intelligent dialogue.14
A. Single-Member Districts—Plurality and Majority Systems
1. Single-Member Districts
Let us focus first on the single-member district (SMD) aspect of
this equation. One of the potential advantages of plurality/majority
systems is that such systems create an identifiable link between the
13. An official English version of the German Federal Elections Law is available at
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/rechtsgrundlagen/bundeswahlgesetz.html.
14. For a detailed and meticulous study of electoral systems worldwide, see ELECTORAL
SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5. For an accessible primer on those systems, see DAVID M.
FARRELL, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION (2001). For an excellent and
balanced bibliography, see DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES 94–98 (2d ed. 2002).
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elected representative and the residents of a geographically distinct
SMD. To the extent that these districts represent true communities of
interest, a system premised on SMDs can promote a healthy form of
democratic pluralism.15 In addition, district representatives often
provide some form of community outreach, and even if most citizens
do not rely on that outreach or cannot even identify their district
representative, others depend on it. And a district representative
certainly has a re-election incentive to attend to the needs of the
district. It is probably true that the value of the representativeconstituent relationship is somewhat romanticized and exaggerated,16
particularly if the district has been gerrymandered to be politically
safe. But it is also true that this relationship is a familiar and
comfortable part of American politics and that it does provide some
benefits to the community that might otherwise be overlooked under
a more geographically remote system.
2. Plurality Systems: First-Past-the-Post
The clear advantage of FPTP stems in part from its familiarity
and in part from its lack of complexity. As to the former, FPTP is
very American in the sense that it identifies a clear and immediate
winner at the end of the day—the candidate with the most votes. We
like that. It is also the system we know. We like that even better. As
to the lack of complexity, FPTP is easy to use and easy to
understand. The voter is given a list of candidates; she selects one.
The candidate receiving the most votes is awarded the seat, and the
party securing the most seats earns a majority-rule mandate to
govern.
Some would further argue that FPTP systems have the positive
effect of discouraging third parties by promoting a healthy two-party
system, under which voters have a distinct choice between opposing
political ideologies.17 In addition, post-election, that clear choice is
15. See James A. Gardner, What Is “Fair” Partisan Representation, and How Can It Be
Constitutionalized? The Case for a Return to Fixed Election Districts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 555,
576–82 (2007).
16. See ROBERT RICHIE & STEVEN HILL, REFLECTING ALL OF US 30–31 (1999); Max
Kaase, Personalized Proportional Representation: The “Mode” of the West German Electoral
System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 155, 162 (Gerald M.
Pomper ed., 1984) (noting empirical evidence of the absence of such ties under the West German
electoral system).
17. See generally ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 141 (discussing the
phenomenon of third-party discouragement in the British FPTP system).
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reflected in a single-party, majority government with a distinct and
identifiable minority opposition. If the voters disapprove of the
majority party’s performance in office, they can vote that party out.
“Toss the bums out,” we like to say.18 (Though most often we let
them stay.) Moreover, so the argument goes, a two-party system
leads to long-term stability since the governing majority has no need
to form potentially unstable coalitions with nonmajority parties.19
FPTP and two-party systems do tend to be mutually
reinforcing.20 It is not clear, however, that the creation or
preservation of a political duopoly is a positive development, for
there is a certain arrogance of entitlement that flows from the
comfort of knowing that one is only temporarily on the windward
side of a revolving door.21 In addition, if the voters “toss the bums
out” in one election cycle, it makes no sense to invite the old bums
back simply because the more recently elected bums have also
performed poorly. A little instability in the ruling class might be a
good thing, allowing for more than an occasional side-door entry. It
is also not clear that two-party systems provide clear choices, other
than a choice between the brands that particular parties represent.
While the two parties may have distinct political bases, one on the
right and the other on the left, the homogeneity between them is
18. For a particularly pointed defense of FPTP as part of a parliamentary system, see
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Send the Rascals Packing: Defects of Proportional Representation
and the Virtues of the Westminster Model, 36 REPRESENTATION 217 (1999), available at
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a780452474.
19. But see Rick Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Corruption, 1997 SUP.
CT. REV. 331, 342–62 (1997) (surveying and critiquing the political science literature on twoparty stability).
20. The thesis that plurality systems lead to a party duopoly is known as Duverger’s Law.
See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE
MODERN STATE (1954); see also AMY, supra note 14, at 94–98 (discussing the veritable oneparty system in some parts of the United States, as well as the plight of minor parties under the
SMP system); Josep M. Colomer, It’s Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger’s
Laws Upside Down), 53 POL. STUD. 1, 1–21 (2005) (hypothesizing that the number of parties
dictates the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way around); Stephen L. Fisher, The
Wasted Vote Thesis, 5 COMP. POL. 293, 293–99 (1973) (considering the idea of the wasted vote in
light of the Federal Republic of Germany’s dualistic electoral system combining single-member
constituencies with PR).
21. See AMY, supra note 14, at 88–108 (noting that plurality rules, bolstered by tradition,
foster two-party systems and disadvantage minor parties, thereby virtually ensuring the continued
dominance of the two major parties); RICHIE & HILL, supra note 16, at 6 (“Winner-take-all
elections prop up our two-party monopoly . . . [and] new parties in the United States are almost
completely shut out of representation.”).
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equally palpable. Finally, it seems distinctly undemocratic to favor
an electoral system that discourages third parties and nonmainstream
viewpoints, essentially creating a wasted-vote phenomenon.22 New
alternatives and perspectives may in fact emerge through the
evolving associations between dominant and minority parties. A true
democracy ought to operate across a wide spectrum of these
possibilities.23
There are other unfavorable consequences associated with
FPTP. Among them are the increased use of political gerrymandering
and the accompanying “safe-seat” agenda,24 the promotion of
negative campaigning in which attack ads dominate and policy
debates play a marginal role,25 the difficulty of electing racial
minorities and women,26 and low voter turnout.27 None of these
characteristics speaks well of this system.
3. Majoritarian Systems: Two-Round,
Alternative Vote, and Condorcet Pairing
Some of the above deficiencies of FPTP can be avoided or
ameliorated under a majority system, i.e., a system that awards
victory to the candidate winning an absolute majority of the vote.

22. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 293–99 (“[I]n cases where there are three parties operating
under the single-majority . . . the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue
to give them to the third party.” (quoting DUVERGER, supra note 20, at 226)). As an aside, it is
interesting that we refer to all parties other than the two dominant parties as “third parties,”
implicitly suggesting that a two-party system is the (preferred) norm.
23. See Richard L. Engstrom, The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting
Rights, in FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? 3, 51–52 (2001) (citing various electoralrelated shortcomings of the two-party system, e.g., Democratic and Republican candidates avoid
taking clear positions on issues, thereby inhibiting debate over policy, voter confidence, and
candidates’ accountability).
24. Id. at 6–12; see also ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 43–44 (delineating
one of the criticisms of FPTP being its dependence on the drawing of electoral boundaries).
25. See AMY, supra note 14, at 74–77, 83–85.
26. Id. at 109–50 (comparing the performance of FPTP and PR systems with respect to the
election of minorities and women); see also ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 37
(stating that since parties tend to put up their “most broadly acceptable candidate” in the FPTP
system, women and minority candidates are often not put on the ballot); RICHIE & HILL, supra
note 16, at 14–18 (stating that women and minority candidates are elected more often with a PR
system, as well as the prevention of gerrymandering under the PR system); Wilma Rule,
Women’s Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems, 27 POL. SCI. & POL. 689, 689 (1994)
(comparing the percentages of women and minority elected officials under various electoral
systems).
27. Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997) (citing supportive studies).
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Majority systems can, however, be more costly and time-consuming
to operate than FPTP systems since majority systems may require a
second round of voting if no candidate achieves a majority in the first
round. On the other hand, the notion of a majoritarian victory is, in
itself, more appealing than the decidedly less democratic plurality
alternative. I will consider two relatively common majority
systems—Two-Round (TR) and Alternative Vote (AV)—and a third
system, which has significant academic support, but which is not
currently being used in the public sector—Condorcet Pairing (CP).
a. Two-round
TR systems require a second round of voting if no candidate
receives a majority of the votes cast in the first round.28 One version
of TR is actually an extended FPTP system in which the winner of
the second round, which usually involves more than two candidates,
is determined by a plurality vote.29 The primary function of this type
of TR system is to eliminate truly marginal candidates identified in
the first round, and thereby promote what might be called a strong or
more credible plurality victory.30
In the second and most common version of TR, only the top two
candidates advance to the second round.31 The one who receives the
most votes in that round will, of course, necessarily receive a
majority of the votes cast in that round; hence, this system is
nominally majoritarian. Theoretically, this type of TR system could
be extended for multiple rounds, eliminating only the lowest-scoring
candidate or candidates in each round, but this is apparently not
considered a viable real-world option. On June 8, 2010, California
voters approved an initiative—Proposition 14, Top Two Primaries
Act—mandating a TR electoral system of this second type for all
congressional and state elective offices.32 This new system is slated

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 52–56.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, JUNE 8, 2010, STATEWIDE DIRECT
PRIMARY ELECTION 35 (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010primary/pdf/2010-complete-sov.pdf (stating proposition passed with a 54 percent majority).
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to go into effect in 2012; there are, however, a number of pending
lawsuits challenging its constitutionality.33
One positive aspect of TR—regardless of type—is that, from a
voter’s perspective, it is as simple as an FPTP system: the voter
selects a single candidate in each round. The first type of TR,
however, shares all the disadvantages of FPTP since it is, essentially,
a two-round version of FPTP; the second type of TR, although
nominally majoritarian, cuts the majority process short by
eliminating all but the top two candidates from the first round. In
addition, both versions of TR are disadvantaged by the
administrative inefficiencies of conducting a second round, by the
potential instability generated by a delayed result, and by a
diminution of voter interest in the second round.
b. Alternative vote, or instant runoff
AV provides an instant runoff if no candidate secures a majority
of first-round votes.34 Under AV, the voter ranks all of the candidates
on a single ballot.35 If, for example, there are five candidates, the
voter ranks each candidate from 1 (first preference) to 5 (fifth
preference). If one candidate receives an absolute majority of the
first-preference votes, then that candidate wins. If no candidate
receives an absolute majority of the first-preference votes, then
the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is
“eliminated” from the count, and his or her ballots are
examined for their second preferences. Each [of these]
ballot[s] is then transferred to whichever remaining
candidate has the highest preference in the order as marked
on the ballot paper. This process is repeated until one
candidate has an absolute majority . . . .36
The AV system is pragmatically superior to the TR system since
AV avoids the negative consequences of holding a second-round
vote. It is also superior to an FPTP form of TR in that, unlike that
system, the AV system does not discourage third parties; rather, it
encourages third parties by eliminating wasted votes and the threat of
33. Bob Egelko, Suit Over Prop. 13 Abolishing Party Primaries, S.F. CHRON., July 30,
2010, at C1.
34. ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 47–49.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 48.
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third-party spoilers. Similarly, AV induces dominant parties to seek
support from minority parties in order to gain second-preference
votes, a consequence that may enhance the legitimacy of the ultimate
victor and, at the same time, promote the development of third
parties.37 AV is also superior, democratically, to the majority version
of TR since that system allows only two candidates to advance to the
second round and thereby artificially cuts short the calculation of
actual voter preference.
AV is, however, more complicated than both forms of TR in that
AV requires the voter to rank among the candidates listed, as
opposed to the seemingly simpler task of selecting only one. But this
moderate complexity has not proved to be problematical for those
nations that have implemented AV systems. Notably, AV has been
used successfully in Australia since 1918.38
c. Condorcet pairing
AV, TR, and FPTP are each subject to anomalies such that the
winning candidate may not be the candidate preferred by a majority
of the voters. This is most clearly seen in FPTP contests in which a
third-party candidate operates as a spoiler, allowing the second-mostpreferred candidate to defeat the first-most-preferred candidate.39 A
similar defeat of the most-preferred candidate also can occur under
AV and TR systems. Consider the following AV hypothetical taken
from Wikipedia:
[I]n a three-candidate field suppose that 40% of voters have
the ranking XYZ, another 40% have the reverse ZYX, and
the remaining 20% have Y as first preference. Here Y is
eliminated in the first round of the count, despite being
preferred by a (different) majority to each of X and Z.40

37. Id. at 49.
38. For a description of Australia’s AV system and its electoral consequences, see Australia:
The Alternative Vote System, ACE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/
ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy_au (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
39. AMY, supra note 14, at 42–43; see also id. at 48–50 (noting the potential capriciousness
of results under an FPTP system).
40. Instant-Runoff Voting, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (detailing the creation of the Condorcet method).
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It is not clear that this outcome is a frequent phenomenon in realworld AV elections, but it is clear that such outcomes do, at least
occasionally, occur in the real world.41
CP, which is designed to avoid the above-described “wrongwinner” phenomenon, is a method by which the electorate’s majority
preference in a multi-candidate field is determined by a comparative
examination of hypothetical “pairings” between each of the
candidates.42 Under the CP method, voters first rank candidates in a
fashion similar to that used in AV. CP is not, however, an instantrunoff system. Rather, it establishes the majority preference by
identifying the candidate who voters would prefer against every
other candidate if separate head-to-head contests were held between
that candidate and each of the other candidates.43 If one candidate
wins all of the head-to-head pairings, that candidate is the Condorcet
winner, i.e., the candidate preferred by the majority over all other
candidates separately considered.
If there is no Condorcet winner, which is sometimes referred to
as a Condorcet paradox, one of several methods may be used to
determine the victor.44 These methods tend to be somewhat
complicated, especially the most popular of them.45 The advantage of
CP in SMD elections is obvious: it avoids the “wrong-winner”
phenomenon when a Condorcet winner can be identified. The
disadvantage of CP is that it is more complicated and less familiar
than any of the other SMD systems we have discussed thus far, and it
is even more complicated when a Condorcet paradox occurs. CP is
also disadvantaged, both politically and practically, by the fact that It
is a relatively esoteric system with no current usages in the public
sphere (unless one counts the primary elections of the Pirate Party of

41. Id. (giving the Burlington, Vermont, mayoral election of 2006 as an example of this
phenomenon).
42. Id.; Condorcet Method, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method (last
visited Oct. 10, 2010); see Marquis de Condorcet, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Marquis_de_Condorcet (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
43. Condorcet Method, supra note 42.
44. Voting Paradox, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_paradox (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010).
45. Schulze Method, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010).

Winter 2011]

APPROXIMATING DEMOCRACY

449

Sweden). There is also an argument that the Condorcet winner is not
necessarily the “right” winner.46
4. The Inherently Undemocratic Character of
Single-Member District Plurality/Majority Electoral Systems
We have now considered several of the usual electoral systems
available for SMD elections: FPTP, TR, AV, and CP. Even if we
could erase (or adjust for) all of the previously observed flaws in
those systems, each of these systems has another more significant
flaw, namely, the inherently unrepresentative character of the SMD
winner-take-all model. That is the precise point being made by John
Stuart Mill in the quotation that introduces this Article. The victor
after an SMD election does not, in fact, represent the entire
constituency; rather, the victor represents only that part of the
constituency that voted for him or (less likely) her. Winner-take-all
does not mean that the winner share the power with the loser; it
means loser-take-nothing. This problem can be compounded at the
legislative level where a majority of the SMD-elected legislators
represents significantly less than a majority of the electorate—a mere
majority of the majority.47
Of course, if one accepts Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of
democracy as nothing more than a competition for power between
opposing political elites, the representational character of the
legislative body is irrelevant.48 Under this point of view, the
victorious party embodies the democracy by virtue of having
achieved the victory, and the victory democratically validates the
exercise of power by the victor. From a more “representative”
perspective on democracy, however, the representational
composition of the lawmaking body provides the key to legitimating
46. See Alec Slatky, Why the Condorcet Criterion Is Less Important Than It Seems,
FAIRVOTE.ORG (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.fairvote.org/why-the-condorcet-criterion-is-lessimportant-than-it-seems/.
47. See RICHIE & HILL, supra note 16, at 9–10. The authors give the following example:
“Suppose, for example, that all representatives win their elections with only 50.1 percent of votes.
A law passed with support from only 50.1 percent of the legislators then would have backing
from only a quarter of votes cast.” Id.
48. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1942). In
Schumpeter’s view, “[t]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote.” Id.; see Allan Ides, The American Democracy and Judicial
Review, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (1991) (discussing Schumpeter’s model).
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the exercise of governmental power.49 To put it simply, Schumpeter’s
model tends to separate the government from the governed, the
primary connection between the two being the electoral contest,
while the participatory model tends to equate the government with
the governed, the essential connection between the two being the
representative nature of the elected governing institution. Consistent
with this latter definition, the inherently unrepresentative outcome of
SMD elections is properly characterized as undemocratic. As one
nineteenth-century commentator put it, “[i]n a democratic
government the right of decision belongs to the majority, but the
right of representation belongs to all.”50
This unrepresentative outcome also suggests that votes cast for
the losers in SMD elections are always wasted in the sense that those
losing votes have no importance once a winner is declared. They are
like the losing tickets in a horse race—so much refuse. In short, the
unrepresentative and undemocratic nature of legislatures chosen
through SMD electoral systems is an inherent characteristic of SMD
legislatures, and no SMD system of which I am aware can erase that
inherency.51
It is actually slightly worse. More than occasionally the party
securing a legislative majority in an SMD plurality/majority election
does not itself receive a majority of the system-wide votes cast in the
election. It is not uncommon for a party that secures only a plurality
of the votes system-wide to end up with a majority of the legislative
seats. This is particularly so when there are spoiler third parties in
FPTP elections. When this happens, we have a system of “plurality
rules.” It can also happen that one party receives a majority of the
system-wide votes but the opposing party wins a majority of the
electoral contests. Here we have rule by minority or by “constructed
majority” where the legislature does not even represent a plurality of
the electorate.52

49. See Ides, supra note 48, at 4–8 (discussing “participatory” theories of democracy).
50. GEORGE H. HALLETT, JR., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 5–6 (1940) (quoting
Ernest Naville).
51. See generally AMY, supra note 14, at 25–51 (discussing the failures of the U.S. SMP
system and potential advantages of the PR system).
52. Id. at 32–39 (citing examples in national elections); HALLETT, supra note 50, at 13–36
(citing examples in municipal elections); R.J. Johnston, Seats, Votes, Redistricting, and the
Allocation of Power in Electoral Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND
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In short, SMD systems, whether plurality- or majority-driven,
are inherently unrepresentative and may even run afoul of the
majority-rule principle they purport to advance. As such, these
systems are aptly described as disproportional systems,53 and they
provide, at best, a “partial” democracy.54
B. Multi-Member Districts—Proportional Representation
An alternative to an SMD plurality/majority electoral system is
an electoral model built around a larger multi-member district
(MMD) with representatives elected through a system-wide measure
of proportionality.55 PR-MMD is a type of party-list system since the
voter votes for a party or party list, and membership in the legislature
is awarded to nominees on the party list. The most obvious and
significant benefit of such a system is that it achieves something
approximating proportional representation of political parties in the
legislature and thereby creates the reality of a working representative
democracy. The difference between PR-MMD and the SMD systems
discussed above is, in fact, the difference between an actual
representative democracy and the façade of one.56
Other more specific benefits of party-list PR-MMD include
fewer absolute losers and wasted votes; less of an incentive to
engage in negative campaigning—a negative ad may hurt one
opponent but help another—and more of an incentive for candidates
to distinguish themselves on the issues; greater encouragement of

ALTERNATIVES, supra note 16, at 59, 60–63 (citing such potential outcomes as one of the
recognized ills of FPTP).
53. See AREND LIJPHART & BERNARD GROFMAN, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 14–16
(1999).
54. LUNI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE 253, 253–56 (1998).
55. Alternatively, one could hold a statewide party-list PR election and avoid the MMD
completely. In such a case, each party’s list could include as many nominees as the number of
seats available in the legislature. I think such an approach would be inadvisable for two related
reasons. If the party list were “closed,” allowing the party alone to determine the order in which
its nominees will be awarded seats in the legislature, the party would be vested with too much
power over the choice of representatives; if the party list were “open,” allowing the voter to rank
the selected party’s nominees, the typical voter would be overwhelmed by the number of
nominees on the list.
56. See HALLETT, supra note 50, for an interesting pre–World War II tract on the
democratic value of PR in municipal elections.
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new parties; more minorities and women elected; and a greater
incentive to vote.57
There are, however, some negatives.58 One potential drawback is
that no individual legislator is charged with representing the
geographic region in which any given voter lives. While each district
would have representatives—multiple representatives—those
representatives may be seen, and may see themselves, as
representing their respective party and not the district. Hence, even
though each district would have multiple representatives, there could
be some attenuation of the traditional relationship between the
individual representative and the constituent. Another way to think of
this is that the MMD representatives may not be perceived as being
individually answerable to the electorate. On the other hand, it is
worth noting that under PR-MMD, should a constituent need to
contact a representative, she will have a choice among the
representatives of her region and may take some comfort in the fact
that a member of her party serves as one of her representatives (if
that is the case). Of course, and more generally, this potential
negative assumes the real-world benefit of the representativeconstituent relationship in SMD systems.
Other concerns with proportionality are that PR leads to
instability since it often requires coalition governments,59 encourages
extremism and the creation of multiple minority parties,60 and
provides no clear governing mandate.61 First, most of these concerns
pertain to parliamentary systems in which a government can fall if a
coalition collapses. In a non-parliamentary system such as ours,
whether two-party or otherwise, coalitions are a normal and fluid
part of the lawmaking process. The “collapse” of a coalition may
57. See ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 57–58; see also John Low-Beer, The
Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 182–188 (1984)
(proposing PR as a constitutional solution to minority underrepresentation). See generally AMY,
supra note 14; KATHLEEN L. BARBER, A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION: PROPORTIONAL ELECTION
SYSTEMS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000) (explaining the mechanics of proportional
voting and the advocacy for its implementation).
58. See ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 58–59.
59. Clark Hogan Taylor, What Is a ‘Fair’ Electoral System?, COLLECTIVE REVIEW (Apr. 27,
2010), http://thecollectivereview.com/clark-hogan-taylor/what-is-a-fair-electoral-system.html.
60. Douglas J. Amy, Common Criticisms of PR and Responses to Them, PR LIBRARY,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/common_criticisms_of_pr.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010).
61. Id.
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doom a piece of proposed legislation, but not a government.62 More
generally, potential instability has been successfully addressed in
modern democracies by requiring minor parties to achieve some
threshold of system-wide support—usually 5 percent or more—
before being awarded representation in the legislature.63 Similarly,
this same threshold requirement should ameliorate any potential to
promote extremism;64 but more to the point, there is empirical
evidence that PR governments in developed democracies tend to be
more centrist, i.e., less extremist, than majoritarian democracies.65 In
any event, I would think that the rise of extremism is more likely a
product of social conditions than it is of any particular electoral
system, and, of course, majoritarian systems are not immune from
extremism.66 In a like fashion, the “problem” of minor parties
disappears with the imposition of a reasonable threshold requirement
and with the recognition that coalition collapse is structurally
irrelevant in a nonparliamentary system. Finally, as to the absence of
a mandate, it is true that in an SMD system the “majority” party has
a mandate to govern, but the actual content of that mandate is far
from clear and often not necessarily (or even likely) supported by a
majority of the electorate or even by a majority of those who vote for
the “majority” party.

62. See Maurice Duverger, Which Is the Best Electoral System?, in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 16, at 31, 36–37 (after noting
potential negatives of PR in parliamentary systems, suggesting that PR might be particularly
appropriate in state legislatures in the United States); Johnston, supra note 52, at 68 (noting
particular suitability of PR to non-parliamentary government systems such as that of the United
States).
63. There is also support for the view that PR systems are more stable than FPTP systems.
See ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 58 (“The West European experience suggests
that parliamentary PR systems score better with regard to governmental longevity, voter
participation and economic performance. The rationale behind this claim is that regular switches
in government between two ideologically polarized parties, as can happen in FPTP systems,
makes long-term economic planning more difficult, while broad PR coalition governments help
engender a stability and coherence in decision making which allow for national development.”);
see also ENGSTROM, supra note 23, at 50–54 (disputing the persuasiveness of the instability
critique); FARRELL, supra note 14, at 193–98 (citing empirical evidence tending to refute the
instability critique).
64. FARRELL, supra note 14, at 198–201.
65. G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY:
MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 175–229, 244–46 (2000).
66. Id. at 200 (citing the political rise of the right-wing National Front in France in the
1990s). And did I hear anyone say, “Tea Party?”
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C. Mixed-Member Systems
Clearly, both SMD and PR-MMD have benefits and drawbacks.
An MMP system seeks to combine the positive aspects of each and
simultaneously ameliorate the negatives. There are a variety of MMP
systems.67 For reasons that will be apparent below, I am going to
focus on the form of MMP that results in a proportional unicameral
legislature. Under this form, a portion of the legislature—let us say
half—is elected in SMD contests; the other half is elected from
MMD contests. The SMD and MMD results are then accommodated
to the system-wide preferences and that accommodation results in a
legislative composition that reflects system-wide proportionality.
Thus, an MMP system with a proportional overlay preserves the
representative-constituent relationship and perhaps improves on it by
creating additional representational options for minor-party
supporters. At the same time, this MMP system ameliorates the
negative and undemocratic aspects of SMD by creating a legislature
that is proportional to the preferences of the electorate.68
The chief drawback of this system is that it is more complex
than our current system. The voter must vote twice on the same
ballot: once for a district representative and once for a party. Some
effort is required, therefore, to ensure that voters understand this dual
responsibility and its consequences.
III. THE NEW CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION—
A PROPORTIONAL LEGISLATURE
For a wide range of reasons, many of which have been or will be
highlighted in this symposium, it is evident that California needs a
new constitution. Our current state constitution, which was designed
in the nineteenth century, is now freighted with ad hoc provisions,
many of which were adopted without adequate consideration for
their system-wide consequences and long-term effects. Because of
this, the California Constitution no longer works. The people of this
state need and deserve a coherent constitution that embodies sound
principles of democracy and good government—by which I mean an
effective and just government—and that protects a clearly stated
67. See Matthew Soberg Shugart & Martin P. Wattenberg, Mixed-Member Electoral
Systems: A Definition and Typology, in MIXED-MEMBER ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THE BEST OF
BOTH WORLDS? 9, 9–24 (Matthew Soberg Shugart & Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2001).
68. See ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 90–103.
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“bill” of fundamental and enforceable human rights. My proposal
should be understood as being a small but important part of this
larger comprehensive constitutional reform project. I will refer to my
proposal as the New California Constitution throughout this Article.
The short version of my proposal is this: The New California
Constitution should provide for a unicameral legislature comprising
(approximately) 320 legislators elected through an MMP system that
combines SMD plurality/majority elections with open-party-list
PR-MMD elections.69 All members of the legislature would serve
four-year terms and the entire legislature would stand for election
together. As an adjunct to this proposal, I propose that the election of
the governor, who would also serve a four-year term, be held in the
middle of the legislature’s four-year term. In addition, the New
California Constitution would vest the governor with the power to
veto legislation, but any such veto could be overridden by a twothirds vote of the legislature.
A. Unicameral Legislature
I see no credible
THE NEW CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
reason for maintaining
a bicameral legislature ARTICLE II. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
in
the
state
of Section 1. Legislature of the State of California. The
branch shall consist of a single chamber entitled
California (or in any legislative
the legislature of the state of California.
state for that matter).
2. Representatives. Members of the legislature shall
The
prototype Section
be known as representatives and shall serve four-year terms
bicameral system is the commencing on the second Monday in January following
British,
class-based their election.
model composed of a parliament divided between the House of
Lords and the House of Commons. That model exists in the United
Kingdom more in name than in practical effect, and even if that
class-based structure retained some modern vitality, it is completely
anathema to the American experience. Moreover, from a democratic
perspective, the only difference between California’s state senate and
assembly is the size of the district represented; our current bicameral
system does not, in any fashion, purport to be based on class or
prestige, or even regionally based. Both houses are now elected on a
69. Cf. Arend Lijphart, Reforming the House: Three Moderately Radical Proposals, 31 POL.
SCI. & POL. 10, 10–12 (1998) (endorsing PR for the election of the U.S. House of
Representatives).
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one-person-one-vote principle and the only structural distinction
between the state senate and state assembly is the size of the
population represented by each, with the state senate districts having
double the population of the assembly districts. As phrased in a 2009
Los Angeles Times essay, the state senate and the assembly are
“functionally indistinguishable.”70
Nor is there any sensible reason for imitating the bicameral
model used by the federal government. Regardless of the merits that
a bicameral model may have as a part of a federal system, those
“federalism” concerns have no relevance whatsoever to the
governance of a unified sovereign state such as California, which is,
quite clearly, not a federal republic. Of course, California does have
several culturally and economically distinct regions, but those
regions can be fully represented by the political engagement of their
population bases as properly represented in a one-house legislature.
One might argue that a bicameral system works as a legitimate
check on democracy by requiring all proposed measures to satisfy
the independent judgment of two distinct legislative bodies however
those bodies are comprised. But this argument is premised on the
assumption that democracy ought to be hobbled in this essentially
random fashion. If both houses represent the same constituency—the
state’s electorate—it is hard to see any long-term, structural benefit
that would derive from making it harder to pass laws, other than
supporting a principle that is essentially anti-government and antidemocracy.71 The current two-house system does no more than
hobble democratic decision making. In fact, when California’s
current bicameral model is coupled with the various super-majority
requirements imposed by the state’s constitution, California has a
system of minority rule under which one-third-plus-one of either
house can block needed and democratically supported legislation.

70. Harold Meyerson, Op-Ed., A One-House Legislature, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at
A35. This excellent essay is well worth reading, as is the entire series of which this essay is a
part. See Op-Eds. & Editorials, The California Fix, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16–Oct. 19, 2009.
71. One might argue that a mixed-member bicameral system with one branch elected
through SMD and the other through some form of PR would create opposing compositions that
might reflect different values, each worthy of checking the other. But it is difficult to predict
exactly what those values would be and how they would differ between the houses of the
legislature, and more difficult yet to explain why one group of particular values should trump
another, especially if the trumping value comes from an institution that does not reflect the
political preferences of the electorate.
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Of course, if the legislature, be it bicameral or unicameral, does
not, in fact, represent the preferences of the electorate, one might
legitimately distrust the so-called democracy. But that potential
pertains to the electoral system and not to the bicameral or
unicameral composition of the legislature. Moreover, in terms of
checks and balances, the mid-session election of the governor,
coupled with the governor’s veto power, should provide a more-thanadequate check on potential democratic excess.
B. The Composition of the Unicameral Legislature—320 Members
Currently,
the
THE NEW CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
California legislature is
composed
of
120 ARTICLE II. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
legislators—forty in the Section 3. Composition of the Legislature. The legislature
consist of 320 representatives and such additional
state senate and eighty shall
representatives as may be required by Section 7 of this
in the assembly. I Article. All representatives shall have equal status and equal
propose that we triple voting rights in the legislature.
that number to 320.72 While 320 may seem like a large number, it
only seems large in relation to the present model. The current
California legislature is actually relatively small when compared to
the legislatures of other states. Thus, while California is the most
populous state—with an estimated 37 million residents in 200973—
the combined membership in the California Senate and Assembly is
smaller than the legislatures of thirty-four other states, including little
New Hampshire, a state that boasts 424 representatives for its 1.3
million residents.74 Not surprisingly, California’s legislature has by
far the largest constituent-to-representative ratio in the nation,75 and
in this sense, the California legislature can be described as the least72. The number, 320, is not magic, but it is certainly somewhere in the ballpark of a sensible
and acceptable size. The essential point is that the legislature of California should be larger given
the population of the state. But the choice of 320 was not completely random; it provides
convenient multiples that make it easy to see the transition from the current forty-plus-eighty
model. Also, 320 should not be seen as an absolute number since proportionality sometimes
requires additional seats. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
73. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2009 (2009),
available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html.
74. Population and Size of Legislature, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13527 (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
75. Legislative Districts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=20662 (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
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democratic state legislature in the nation. More representatives and
the resultant smaller ratios would be a positive step toward
connecting the representatives with the electorate, which would seem
to be an essential component of an effective democracy.76
C. A Mixed-Member Electoral System
Recall that an MMP
THE NEW CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
electoral system relies on
ARTICLE II. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
two electoral devices, one
for
the
election
of
Section 4. Districts. The state shall be divided into
160 districts of equal population. Each district shall be
representatives of singleentitled to one district representative.
member
districts,
Section. 5. Regions. The state shall be divided into
emphasizing a geographic
twenty regions of equal population. Each region shall
connection
to
the
be entitled to eight regional representatives.
representative, and one for
Section 6. The Election of Representatives. District
representatives shall be elected through a singlethe election representatives
member district plurality or majority electoral system.
of
larger
MMDs,
Regional representatives shall be elected through a
proportional, open-party-list system.
emphasizing party choice.
Under my proposal, half of
the 320 legislators (160 legislators) would be elected in SMD
electoral contests in relatively small, SMDs (“districts”). The other
half would be elected though an open-party-list system in PR
contests in larger MMDs (“regions”).77
As to the SMDs, each would have roughly the same population
in order to conform to the one-person-one-vote principle. If we
consider the current assembly model, with eighty districts, we can
76. Cf. Lijphart, supra note 69, at 12 (endorsing an increase from 435 to 650 members for
the U.S. House of Representatives).
77. The New America Foundation has proposed a similar MMP electoral reform for
California, with the regional elections being keyed to certain politically and geographically
identified communities of interest. See MARK PAUL & MICAH WEINBERG, NEW AM. FOUND.,
REMAPPING A NATION WITHOUT STATES: PERSONALIZED FULL REPRESENTATION FOR
CALIFORNIA’S 21ST CENTURY (2008), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/
naf_nations_paper_v4.pdf. I am in general agreement with this interesting and sophisticated
proposal and in complete agreement with the Foundation’s arguments in favor of a unicameral,
proportionally elected legislature. I have some concerns, however, both practical and
philosophical, with the regional representation aspect of this proposal. The key difficulty, for me,
is in finding a way to agree on what constitutes a geographically and culturally identifiable
community of interest. Moreover, even if an initial agreement can be brokered, there would be an
ongoing obligation to monitor the boundaries of the initially defined communities as our social
and political culture morphs into different communities of interest. Hence, I prefer a populationdriven system that necessarily incorporates that changing morphology without a need to identify
those changes other than as population change.
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see that the new model would double that number to 160. It follows
that the resulting districts would halve the populations of the current
districts (adjusting for any statewide population change) and thereby
provide a smaller and more democratic constituent-to-representative
ratio. For the moment, let us leave open the question of which SMD
system we should use in the district elections.
As to the multi-member regions, each region would be the
equivalent in population size to two current state senate districts, i.e.,
twice the size of a current state senate district (adjusting for any
statewide population change). Thus, the new model would consist of
twenty regions, and each of these regions would be eight times more
populous than an SMD.78 Accordingly, each region would elect eight
representatives for a total of 160 multi-member representatives.
These representatives would be elected through a party-list PR
system. (It would also make sense for each region to be constructed
of eight districts.)
Party-list PR is the most common PR system used for electing
members of a large representative body. Under a party-list system,
each political party submits a list of candidates for the electorate’s
consideration. On Election Day, voters vote for the party (list) of
their choice. If the list is “closed,” the party’s ranking of its
candidates controls; if the list is “open,” voters retain the option of
reranking the candidates. Typically, a party must achieve some
minimum support in order to be awarded any representatives. The
parties achieving that threshold are then awarded seats in the
legislative branch in proportion to their shares of the vote received.
The winning candidates are selected from the qualifying party’s list
in the order ranked by the party or by the voters.79
I propose that the representatives of the multi-member regions
be chosen through an open-party-list system.80 I favor the open list
78. Using population as the measure, the current state senate districts are two times larger
than the current Assembly districts. The new regions are two times larger than the current state
senate districts, and, therefore, will be four times larger than the current assembly districts (2 x 2)
and eight times larger than the new SMDs (2 x 2 x 2), which are slated to be half the size of the
current assembly districts. Thus, each region will consist of eight representatives in accord with
the one-person-one-vote principle.
79. ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 60–71.
80. My proposal is somewhat oversimplified, as it does not include a formula for measuring
proportionality. The choice of the appropriate formula is significant. See Arend Lijphart, The
Political Consequences of Electoral Law, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481, 481–96 (1990). Quite
obviously, before the proposal is finalized and implemented a proper measure must be adopted.
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because it tempers party power and modestly increases voter power.
Under this proposal, each party qualifying to be on the ballot would
nominate a list of eight candidates for each of the twenty regions. On
the same day that voters choose their district representatives, voters
would also select their party of choice in the regional election; in
addition, they would rank in order the candidates listed by that party.
The ballots would then be tallied statewide to determine each party’s
proportional share of the whole, 5 percent being the minimum vote
that would entitle a party to representation in the legislature.
D. Distribution of Seats
Given that the overall
THE NEW CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
system is MMP, i.e., a
ARTICLE II. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
combination of SMD and PR,
in order to achieve systemSection 7. Distribution of Seats. A party’s total
representation in the legislature, combining
wide
proportionality,
the
district and regional representatives, shall be the
number of seats won in the
equivalent of that party’s total share of the
statewide open-party-list vote. If a party receives
SMD contests must be
more district seats than its proportion of the
subtracted from the potential
statewide open-party-list vote, that party shall
retain those district seats but additional
number of seats that would
representation in the legislature will be awarded
otherwise be awarded in the
to other parties in order to achieve each party’s
proportionate share of the seats. A party
PR contest. For example, let us
receiving less than 5 percent of the statewide
say Parties A, B, C, and D
open-party-list vote shall not be entitled to any
proportionate share of representation in the
receive 45 percent, 35 percent,
legislature unless that party has also won at least
18 percent, and 2 percent of
three district contests in the same election.
the
statewide
vote,
respectively. Party A would be entitled to 45 percent of the regional
representatives minus the number of districts it won in the singlemember contests. Parties B and C would have their allocations
similarly calculated based on their respective percentages of regional
votes minus their respective single-member victories. Party D would
receive no allocation, because it would not have achieved the 5
percent minimum.81 If a party wins more district contests than its
proportional share of the system-wide vote, it would retain those
district seats, but additional seats would be awarded to other parties
The debate over this choice is likely to be hyper-technical and I do not think that any particular
formula should be “constitutionalized” as a relatively permanent fixture of the proposed system.
81. In some systems, the percentage shares of the system-wide vote are recalculated after
subtracting the votes of the parties receiving less than the threshold minimum.
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to achieve overall proportionality. The net result is that the
qualifying parties should achieve overall representation in the state
legislature that approximates their respective proportional share of
the statewide vote in the regional contests.
E. A System for Electing District Representatives
Now we must decide which of the SMD electoral systems to
adopt for the district elections. There are two ways to resolve this
dilemma. First, we might wish to adopt the system with the fewest
democratic downsides. To my way of thinking, that eliminates FPTP
and both versions of TR since each of these systems has more
democratic downsides than AV. AV is the obvious alternative;
however, AV does run the risk of the “wrong winner” phenomenon,
so it is far from perfect. One possible solution is to adopt AV with
the caveat that if AV fails to elect the Condorcet winner (and there is
such a winner), then the Condorcet winner would be elected in place
of the AV winner—in other words, AV with a CP trump. With such
an approach we would avoid the deep complexities of Condorcet
methods triggered by the Condorcet paradox and, at the same time,
significantly reduce the potential anomalies of AV. In short, our first
approach could be to adopt something approaching the most
democratic option. But, as noted previously, there is some debate as
to whether the Condorcet winner ought to trump the AV winner. We
would have to resolve that debate.
Second, we could simply adopt FPTP for the district elections.
But why, the reader asks, choose the least democratic option?
Because it does not matter. With the overlay of the PR-MMD system
described above, the potential downside of an FPTP system is diluted
by the system-wide proportionality that emerges from the openparty-list vote. Thus, the FPTP discouragement of third parties is
erased by the imposition of system-wide proportionality. The
potential spoiler effect in an FPTP contest becomes inconsequential
if the gain of an FPTP seat is offset by the loss of a potential regional
seat. Furthermore, the type of SMD system chosen should have no
effect on PR’s ability to elect more minorities and women. In other
words, the PR aspect of the MMP system dilutes the negative
consequences of FPTP. And if it truly does not matter, a simple and
familiar system may be the more persuasive option. More generally,
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the best option would be to leave the choice between a plurality and
majority system to the legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly, adoption of this electoral reform proposal—or
something akin to this proposal—will not cure all the ills that plague
the governance of the state of California. It will, however, dissolve
the hegemony of the two-party system and likely make the two
dominant parties more flexible and more responsive to the electorate.
This alone would be a major stride forward. Moreover, as noted
above, this proposal is but one part of a larger project of
constitutional revision. To succeed, all the parts must cohere.
Nevertheless, reforming the electoral system may be one of the most
critical parts of the larger project. The creation of a more
representative legislative branch—or even the possibility of one—
might provide the electorate the confidence it needs to abandon its
distrust of government. Thus, with constitutional reformation and an
overall heightened level of societal confidence, the state of California
will begin to see positive improvements in the delivery of intelligent,
just, and effective governance.

